While Russian leaders support the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons in theory, the Russian security community is still committed to the principle of nuclear deterrence.
The fundamental driving force of the insurgency is not economic or tribal but political, and long-term stability in Afghanistan depends on creating an open, transparent process to renegotiate the political structure of the nation in a way that includes the insurgency without betraying the Afghan people.
President Obama’s decision to meet with the Dalai Lama quietly is a recognition of the fact that almost every global issue requires cooperation between China and the United States, and some restraint must be shown on issues that China considers “core interests.”
Armenia and Turkey have a chance to move forward from their troubled past by ratifying the historic protocols signed in October 2009. While the governments in both Yerevan and Ankara face strong opposition to the protocols, a failure to ratify the agreement could have disastrous consequences for the entire region.
The conference in London failed to suggest viable solutions to the real problems facing Afghanistan, including President Karzai’s lack of credibility, the prevalence of local corruption, and the fragmentation of power into the hands of armed local militias.
U.S. rhetoric has become more closely aligned with European positions on the Arab-Israeli peace process and democracy and human rights promotion in the Middle East, but there has not been a significant increase in transatlantic cooperation on these issues.
At the international conference on Afghanistan in London, the international community should address the only issue that really matters for peace in Afghanistan: how to make the Taliban part of a lasting solution.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's proposed European security treaty has its flaws, but it is a first step toward an important conversation that must take place if a viable and undivided Euro-Atlantic security space is to be created.
In response to the challenges facing the region, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative—an international commission to build the intellectual framework for an inclusive transatlantic security system for the 21st century—has been launched.
The European Union’s Afghanistan policies are the result of two different and contradictory constituencies: the transatlantic one, consisting of the United States and its European interests, and, on the other end of the spectrum, local party activists, who view Afghanistan as an unnecessary and dangerous war.
In the United States, the debate over the future of the war in Afghanistan is playing out in public, with the report by General Stanley McChrystal representing one fundamental position, and Senator John Kerry’s October 26 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations representing another.
As this year's presidential election illustrated, Afghanistan’s key problem is its lack of a credible government; while most Afghans do not want the Taliban back, they see the government of Hamid Karzai as entirely corrupt.
The reality is that many Afghans see Kabul as part of the problem, and a runoff election is unlikely to change that. If the new Afghan government is to earn public support, and NATO is to find a way out of Afghanistan, a civilian surge will be vital.
When Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's secretary-general, addresses an audience at Carnegie Europe on Friday, 18th September, he will speak about the possibility of a new dialogue between two former foes – NATO and Russia. Dmitri Trenin suggests that these discussions could initially take place through the NATO-Russia Council of 2002, but in time, that they might spawn a new framework altogether.
The EU should commit itself to a ‘civilian surge', but with Afghan rather than European civilians.
Both the U.S. and French Presidents, Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy, have brought key opposition figures into their administrations. As Fabrice Pothier argues, in both cases their policy influence has been minimal.
The EU-Pakistan summit should mark the beginning of a new strategic partnership that helps Islamabad deal with its immediate crisis and helps transform a weakened state into a modern Muslim democracy.
Fabrice Pothier explains the scale of the the opium problem in Afghanistan and argues for a decoupling of counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations.
The Dalai Lama problem has been in the way of an EU-China "strategic partnership" for a long time, and there continues to be miscalculations on both sides about each other's stand on this issue.
NATO's new war on drugs in Afghanistan will put troops in greater danger for a venture that may not even work. It just might be the straw that breaks the alliance's back.