In spite of discussions highlighting the intense partisanship of U.S. politics, there is a strong bipartisan consensus on the key issues of U.S. foreign policy, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.
Russia is already doing much to help the alliance in its struggle against the Taliban insurgency, yet there is a growing feeling in the West that Moscow could be playing a more decisive role in Afghanistan.
U.S. Secretary of State Clinton leaves for Moscow for a Quartet meeting on efforts to revive Israeli–Palestinian peace talks. She will also meet with President Medvedev to address the bilateral agenda, not least the successor agreement to START and Iran's nuclear program.
Rather than expending energy solidifying relations with long term allies, the Obama administration has focused its foreign policy efforts on improving relations with its competitors and adversaries.
Given the reset in U.S.–Russian relations, the time is ripe for the United States, Europe, and Russia to devise a security architecture for a new century—one capable of maintaining peace and stability on the European continent throughout the years to come.
The announcement of new construction in East Jerusalem that interrupted U.S. Vice President Biden’s trip to Israel to reinvigorate peace negotiations reflects the strained relations between Israel and the United States and how much remains to be done before Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can lead to real progress.
While the economic crisis has caused widespread economic suffering, it appears that democracies, even struggling ones, are demonstrating more resilience to the crisis than many predicted.
Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary election will not bring about any decisive changes. Elections do not cause significant power shifts; they can only reflect the power shifts that have already taken place.
In spite of the general perception that partisanship is dividing the U.S. government, a broad bipartisan consensus is emerging on issues of foreign policy, particularly towards Afghansitan, Iraq, and Iran.
The goal of nuclear superiority is unattainable. Instead, the United States can enhance its security by giving nuclear-armed adversaries strong incentives for restraint in a crisis.