The NATO meeting of heads of state and government slated for May 25 is certain to center on a handful of key issues, defense spending primary among them. On this matter, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump hopes to accelerate the achievement of defense spending goals to which the alliance has already agreed. For their part, European NATO member states are likely to parry such requests and avoid committing to anything more than they already have.
Although not the worst in European NATO when it comes to burden sharing, Germany has recently been the focus of attention in the transatlantic debate over defense spending, primarily because of its large, prosperous economy and its position as first among equals in Europe. Unfortunately, Berlin appears to be hiding behind a number of specious arguments to avoid doing more than it has already announced.
In recent intra-alliance debates over defense spending, Germany has frequently relied on three arguments to counter Washington. First, Berlin has argued that foreign aid should count toward security spending. This is a view widely held across most of Europe—that diplomacy and development are just as important as the military in providing achievable, sustainable security. This comprehensive approach, as it’s known in Europe, is similar to the whole-of-government approach pursued, at least rhetorically, by the United States for many years as well.
Germany is correct that diplomacy and development are critical components of Western security. For example, there appears to be a positive correlation between some types of foreign assistance and reductions in terrorist attacks. At the same time, other evidence suggests that the connection between foreign aid and positive security or development outcomes is mixed at best. More importantly, though, Germany—along with the other members of the alliance—made a political commitment to spend the equivalent of 2 percent of its GDP on defense, not on foreign assistance. Roping in foreign aid muddles the focus on defense spending and would necessitate a complete reexamination of security spending goals.
The second argument frequently relied on in Germany is that the 2 percent goal ignores defense spending outputs. It is true that the 2 percent goal fails to measure what the allies get for their defense dollars, euros, and pounds. Berlin argues, for instance, that German contributions to current operations should count for something.
European leaders—especially those willing and able to deploy forces abroad over distance and time—are right to press for inclusion of output measures. Until allies agree on a fair, accurate, more comprehensive measure of outputs, however, NATO could simply publish progress toward the usability goals it already tracks. At their Wales summit in 2014, allies pledged once again to meet their usability goals: 50 percent of each member’s overall land force strength should be deployable, and 10 percent of that strength should be either engaged in or earmarked for sustained operations. However, allies failed to publish progress toward the goals. Making these data public would be a simple, interim way of assessing outputs.
Third, although not often stated publicly, many in Germany fear that increasing defense spending to the equivalent of 2 percent of GDP—yielding a budget of $67 billion, far higher than the current $41 billion—would raise fears among Germany’s neighbors of the country’s overmilitarization and domination. Germany has long preferred to be in third place among European NATO member states, behind the United Kingdom ($56 billion) and France ($44 billion): a leader, but not the leader. A defense budget of $67 billion would make Germany the largest defense spender in European NATO.
To think that a significantly larger German defense budget alone would send chills through Germany’s neighbors is probably inaccurate. For one thing, Germany remains steadfastly anchored by its own constitution and by Western multilateral institutions such as NATO and the EU, which collectively prevent potential militaristic adventurism.
Moreover, Germany’s European allies—especially those to the East—seem eager for Berlin’s leadership in defense and security. Germany has been welcomed as a framework nation in NATO’s enhanced forward presence initiative, sending its forces to Lithuania on a rotational basis. And although he was speaking of more than just the military, former Polish foreign minister Radosław Sikorski famously said in 2011, “I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity.” In the same vein, Baltic state leaders recognize that in any armed crisis launched by Russia, Germany would play an important role as a first responder.
It seems increasingly apparent that some German officials are relying on a fallacious set of arguments, including the purported concerns of other European countries, as a convenient excuse to avoid spending more on defense. With the September federal election just around the corner, campaign politics are playing a role as well—German Chancellor Angela Merkel is keen to avoid making defense spending any more of a campaign issue than it already is. More practically, Berlin is right to want to ensure increased defense spending is purposeful and avoids unnecessary duplication.
But there is no shortage of needs in the Bundeswehr, including filling units that are fully manned only on paper, ending an equipping model whereby only deploying units receive their full complement of equipment, and replenishing woefully underfunded readiness accounts. Other necessities include expanded intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities and sufficient modernized infrastructure not simply for German forces but also for U.S. and other allied forces based in Germany.
In sum, given the many important defense and security requirements facing the Bundeswehr, as well as the political commitments taken on by the German government, the arguments for not doing more seem increasingly dubious at best.
John R. Deni is a research professor of security studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and an adjunct professor at the American University’s School of International Service. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of the U.S. Department of the Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Comments(3)
The real answer below all the "arguments" you listed is this: For most germans the military level of ambition only requires the Wachbataillon and a music band in Berlin for the protocol during state visits. That's the fundamental reason politicians are unwilling to blow large sums on the Bundeswehr. It doesn't help them win elections (rather the opposite), is of no use in our political culture and worst of all it could rouse unwanted foreign interest in german auxiliary services in operations without any relation to Germany.
The recent wars in Afghanistan and with IS show clearly that we are confronted with a new type of war, in which budgeting is not the determining factor in the prosecution of the war. It is clear that NATO was actually defeated in Afghanistan, without the Taliban (and IS) increasing their military budget, or acquiring new technological capabilities. Saudi Arabia has one of the largest defense budgets in the world, and access to some of the most sophisticated weapons in the world, yet they can’t defeat the Houthi insurgency (this one supported by Iran, but rather limited). The Trump administration should be very clear: “The EU, the largest, wealthiest entity in Western World history should be able to defend itself against any conventional attack, of any scale.” (The UK is still an EU member for the next two years). It is common knowledge that at the height of the Cold War the US would have used nuclear weapons to stop a Soviet attack; there was no other way, the size of the Soviet armor was too overwhelming. If this would have been just a tactical, localized war, which would not escalate into a full scale nuclear war, that is a separate discussion. This position should be made clear today. This time Russia, with limited mobile forces, and economically incapable of sustaining a long term war, could threaten using nuclear weapons very early in the conflict. If the case, the US will retaliate, with the same question of escalation to a full scale nuclear war left open. The EU NATO members should be prepared to fight a popular war, borrowing the Swiss concept; there is no way the Russian Army will get to Paris like two centuries ago (not to mention what exactly would they be doing there). A very limited contingent of ground US forces should be involved; the Navy and Air Force, that is a different story, they are already there. The worst part is that neither NATO/US nor Russia appear to realize that axis mundi has moved away from the Western world. World War 0 (1904) was a colonial war fought by an European power (Russian Empire) with a rising colonial power (Japanese Empire) over the partition of China. Russia’s defeat electrified many nationalists in India, Poland, Vietnam, Iran who realized that the European colonial powers are not invincible. More than a century later, everything has changed. If there is a war involving a mere billion people from a civilization where war is cyclical, what exactly are the other many billions supposed to do?
Europe is not the US. Having learnt from idiotic wars building up with more arms and less investment in culture the preferred option which the military US cannot abide let alone comprehend. Europe has the military advantage as it is. Warmongering belongs in the Dark Ages that the US foreign policy on the ground is delivering to the Middle East under the laughable moniker of democracy American style. Worse than the wild west which they seem to be stuck in. Still
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