Pettis, an expert on China’s economy, is professor of finance at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, where he specializes in Chinese financial markets.
Michael Pettis is a nonresident senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program based in Beijing. An expert on China’s economy, Pettis is professor of finance at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, where he specializes in Chinese financial markets.
From 2002 to 2004, he also taught at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management and, from 1992 to 2001, at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business. He is a member of the Institute of Latin American Studies Advisory Board at Columbia University as well as the Dean’s Advisory Board at the School of Public and International Affairs.
Pettis worked on Wall Street in trading, capital markets, and corporate finance since 1987, when he joined the sovereign debt trading team at Manufacturers Hanover (now JPMorgan). Most recently, from 1996 to 2001, Pettis worked at Bear Stearns, where he was managing director principal heading the Latin American capital markets and the liability management groups. He has also worked as a partner in a merchant-banking boutique that specialized in securitizing Latin American assets and at Credit Suisse First Boston, where he headed the emerging markets trading team.
In addition to trading and capital markets, Pettis has been involved in sovereign advisory work, including for the Mexican government on the privatization of its banking system, the Republic of Macedonia on the restructuring of its international bank debt, and the South Korean Ministry of Finance on the restructuring of the country’s commercial bank debt.
He formerly served as a member of the Board of Directors of ABC-CA Fund Management Company, a Sino–French joint venture based in Shanghai. He is the author of several books, including The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2013).
If Europe’s right-wing politicians continue to gain support for their anti-euro policies, mainstream leaders risk becoming marginal to the debate on the eurozone crisis.
Spanish unemployment is largely due to German austerity. As long as Spain cannot run its own monetary policy, Madrid cannot address the root cause of its unemployment crisis.
Is the debt crisis in the eurozone over? Or will it get worse? The answer doesn’t simply depend on the level of debt. At least three other factors also come into play.
China’s economy does not need to grow at 7.5 percent a year. What matters is that Chinese households continue to improve their lives at the rate to which they are accustomed.
Within a few years China will have more old people than any other country. Beijing will have to become a leader in addressing the problems of an aging population.
If China is to rebalance its economy, the policies that subsidized Chinese exports must be reversed. As this happens, manufacturing in the rest of the world will surge.
Beijing is facing a financial dilemma: it must reduce investment and slow the growth of debt, but if it does so it will face stiff opposition from vested interests.
Growth will not return to Europe until Europeans heed the lessons of past financial crises and permanently resolve their debt problems.
The euro crisis cannot be resolved if only low-savings countries adjust, because their low savings rates may themselves have been caused partly by high savings abroad.
This year may mark the beginning of China’s most difficult period since the beginning of the reforms in 1978.