The Cyprus conflict is less toxic than many other disputes in Europe. It has moved from the realm of violence into politics and law, similar to the Transdniestria dispute. The situation on the ground is more tolerable as standards of living are also higher. Much has been agreed in negotiations, and there is a fair amount of people-to-people contact and civil society interaction.
Yet, as in the other cases, the negotiations are deadlocked over issues of security, power-sharing, and eventual status, leaving the two sides in a state of insecurity and uncertainty. This especially hurts the Turkish Cypriots, who have lived for decades in a de facto state that is semi-open to the world but whose international status is still unclear.
Turkish Cypriots have lived in a de facto state since November 15, 1983, when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed, only for the declaration to be called “legally invalid” by the United Nations Security Council three days later. The bid for independence was not universally welcomed inside northern Cyprus at the time. Turkish Cypriots express a much wider spectrum of political views on the status of their homeland than do people in Abkhazia or Transdniestria.
In 2004, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted to abandon the project in favor of the United Nations’ Annan Plan for reunification only for Greek Cypriots to reject the plan. Paradoxically, the vote left the path clear for Greek Cypriots to join the European Union. The northern part of the island is in the curious condition of being part of the EU but with key membership benefits suspended unless and until reunification is achieved.
A well-known joke holds that the Cyprus issue is “essentially a problem of thirty thousand Turkish troops faced off against thirty thousand Greek Cypriot lawyers.”1 The Greek Cypriot side raises strong legal objections to any interim measures that are seen to validate the de facto Turkish regime on the other side of the Green Line that divides the two territories. Yet Turkish Cypriots argue they have a right to live more fully in the present, rather than merely wait for an endlessly postponed settlement. That argument resonates more strongly since 2017, when the latest refashioned peace plan was abandoned after the UN declared that there had been insufficient progress.
A well-known joke holds that the Cyprus issue is “essentially a problem of thirty thousand Turkish troops faced off against thirty thousand Greek Cypriot lawyers.”
In practice, northern Cyprus is more open to the world than either Abkhazia or Transdniestria, for example receiving thousands of tourists each year, some of whom fly directly into the airport at Ercan. The term “Taiwanization” is employed to describe its condition—with negative associations on the Greek Cypriot side and positive ones on the Turkish Cypriot one. If this continues, there will be calls to regularize its irregular status, as is the case with Taiwan.
The Cyprus conflict dates back more than sixty years. The Republic of Cyprus only existed for a few years as a functioning state shared by two communities after it achieved independence from Great Britain in 1960. This was an agreed compromise—for most a second-best option—to accommodate the wishes of both the majority Greek Cypriot community (around 78 percent of the population) and the Turkish Cypriots (an estimated 18 percent).
Absent political will and cooperation in government, the power-sharing arrangement broke down in 1963. Ten years of division and occasional communal violence ensued. In 1974, full-scale conflict broke out. The military junta holding power in Athens installed a hard-line government favoring the union of Cyprus and Greece. On July 20, Turkey intervened militarily, saying it was compelled to act as a “guarantor power” to protect the Turkish Cypriots. On August 14, the Turkish military began a second and much more brutal invasion. Over three days, the Turkish army drove tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots from their homes and put 36 percent of the island, including many areas inhabited by Greek Cypriots, under Turkish control.
Thousands of lives were lost in the conflict, mostly on the Greek Cypriot side, and almost half of the island’s population became refugees. Around 160,000 Greek Cypriots were displaced from their homes in the north while almost all Turkish Cypriots in the south also lost their homes, most of them settling in houses abandoned by Greek Cypriots in the north. The property issue still looms large. As much as three-quarters of private land under the possession of Turkish Cypriots in the north still has legitimate Greek Cypriot owners, and around one-eighth of private land in the south is still formally owned by Turkish Cypriots.2
The conflict left the Greek Cypriot side as the internationally recognized custodians of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots in an uncertain state. Around 35,000 Turkish troops remained on the island, in defiance of international objections and UN resolutions. (The number has probably fallen since then, but there are no verified figures.) Generations of UN mediators have come and gone, trying to negotiate a formula that the Security Council in 1992 defined as “a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities.”3
The conflict left the Greek Cypriot side as the internationally recognized custodians of the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots in an uncertain state.
In 1974, the Turkish Cypriot leaders named their homeland the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which implied it was the constituent state of a federation. Then, in November 1983, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş announced the formation of the TRNC as an independent state. Turkey recognized it, but the UN declared it illegitimate in Security Council Resolution 541.4 The TRNC project was at an even greater disadvantage than Abkhazia and Transdniestria because its borders had been drawn by war—they at least were defined autonomous territories in the Soviet Union. The international consensus was that accepting its independence would validate conquest, and only the country generally seen as the occupying power, Turkey, has been prepared to do this.
A left-right split developed among Turkish Cypriots, with leftists and trade unionists more likely to favor a federal agreement with Greek Cypriots and rightists more supportive of independence or union with Turkey. Some on the left openly condemned the independence declaration on the grounds that “the TRNC’s founding in 1983 was the day we closed our doors to the world.”5 Even Denktaş expressed some ambiguity about his decision and hinted that the declaration had been a bargaining maneuver intended to convey the frustration of the Turkish Cypriots and their determination to get a better offer. Invited to address the United Nations debate on Cyprus in November 1983, Denktaş said that his people had accepted a bi-communal state but had been denied equal status by the “robber” Greek Cypriots. Denktaş said, “We are not seceding. We are not seceding from the independent state of Cyprus, from the Republic of Cyprus—if the chance would be given to us to re-establish a bi-zonal federal system. But if the robbers of my rights continue to insist that they are the legitimate government of Cyprus, we shall be as legitimate as they, as non-aligned as they, as sovereign as they in the northern state of Cyprus.”6
While aggressive rhetoric still abounds, the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict have moved in a positive direction since the 2000s. There is little prospect of a return to armed conflict. The most important breakthrough came in 2003 when the Green Line dividing the island was opened, allowing ordinary people to cross. It is now a fairly benign boundary that can be crossed in a couple of a minutes. Cypriots on both sides have frequently visited family homes they lost in the conflict of 1974, and there have been no reports of violence. Although the two sides inhabit different cultural worlds and only the older generation now speaks the other’s language, when they do meet, the two communities interact freely. There is an active constituency of businessmen, academics, and artists on both sides who support mutual compromise and call for reconciliation.
The most important breakthrough came in 2003 when the Green Line dividing the island was opened, allowing ordinary people to cross.
However, the fundamental issues remain unresolved. Turkish Cypriots still complain that they have been the victims of inequality from Greek Cypriots since at least the 1960s and that they need high levels of self-government to be protected from discrimination. They cite the 2004 referendum as proof that they are ready for reunification that honors these principles.
For the Greek Cypriots, the central fact is the Turkish invasion and displacement of 160,000 of their ethnic kin from their homes. They cite UN resolutions and the ECHR judgment of 1996—the Loizidou case—as evidence that they are dealing with an occupying force and an illegitimate Turkish Cypriot regime. In the words of one Greek Cypriot official, the de facto state on the other side is “an artificial creation as a result of an invasion,” and enhanced contacts with Turkish Cypriot officials thereby legitimizes the invasion. So Greek Cypriot policy operates within a very strict framework that accepts engagement with the other side only so long as it is in service of a settlement to the conflict and reunification of the island. As the official puts it, it is a path that must run “through settlement to legality,” not the other way round. Another Greek Cypriot interlocutor talks of “the fear that if we lose the recognition battle we will have no other cards in our hands.”7
Northern Cyprus Today
Entering northern Cyprus, a visitor crosses a checkpoint above which hangs a giant banner saying “TRNC forever.” However, spending a few days in the territory confirms that the TRNC project receives little active support. The de facto authorities do not pursue recognition, as in Abkhazia. Rather, the project continues by default, given the absence of other options.
The opening of the Green Line in 2003 has made for much greater people-to-people contact and business links. Turkish Cypriots with EU passports cross the line frequently, however, there is little institutional collaboration as the Greek Cypriot government holds almost all Turkish Cypriot institutions to be illegitimate. An exception is made only for institutions that already had a legal identity as Turkish Cypriot when the Republic of Cyprus adopted its constitution in 1960. So Turkish Cypriot schools are accepted as legitimate, but not institutions of higher education, which did not exist at the time. There is cooperation with two Turkish Cypriot organizations dating back to the 1950s, the municipality of northern Nicosia and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. This has enabled the mayors of the two halves of Nicosia to collaborate on infrastructure projects and a shared sewage system.
The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot Chambers of Commerce (TCCC and GCCC) work closely together on facilitating trade across the Green Line. When a big explosion at a munitions dump knocked out power across the south of the island in 2011, the Greek Cypriot authorities refused to receive electricity from the de facto authorities in the north. However, the Chambers of Commerce successfully acted as brokers, buying and selling electricity from and to their respective authorities, so recognition issues could be avoided.
For various reasons, the northern Cypriot “brand” is more acceptable internationally than that of its counterparts, and several countries have adopted a pragmatic approach to Turkish Cypriots’ problems. For example, for many years, France, the UK, and the United States have allowed Turkish Cypriots to travel abroad on TRNC passports with visas issued by consular officials based in Nicosia. In other words, TRNC passports are accepted as travel documents but not as identification from an official state.8
Northern Cyprus also receives tens of thousands of foreign tourists every year. Some Europeans even own holiday homes in the north of the island, despite legal disputes over property. It also has a booming higher education sector whose universities take in thousands of international students every year. The quality of the education is highly variable, but a handful of the universities are well-respected, in particular the Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU) in Famagusta. The Greek Cypriot authorities contend that the EMU is an illegitimate institution built on land that legally belongs to Greek Cypriot citizens. However, it has built up a strong academic reputation, and it has circumvented the recognition problems faced by its counterparts in Abkhazia and Transdniestria by making bilateral agreements with universities around the world and having its teaching standards recognized by international accreditation agencies. The EMU now claims to have 20,000 students from more than 100 countries and to have more than 200 collaboration agreements with international universities.
Turkish Cypriots have become part of the global economic marketplace via Turkey, albeit as consumers rather than producers. A few international companies value their relationship with Turkey so much that they are prepared to trade directly with Turkish Cyprus and lose business in the Republic of Cyprus. For example, the British financial company HSBC opened bank branches in the north of Cyprus, treating it basically as a part of Turkey, and was prepared to receive legal challenges and suffer damage to its reputation in the south as a result.9 Gloria Jeans, the international café company, has made the same calculation.
Turkey is a more active patron to northern Cyprus than Russia is in the other two case studies. It refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus in what it calls an act of solidarity. For years, Turkey was Turkish Cypriots’ only outlet to the world. In the pre-digital world, all mail to the north of the island was routed via the address “Mersin 10,” a reference to the port opposite Cyprus on the Turkish mainland. Turkish direct financial assistance funded government activities, and the Turkish lira has served as a currency. Universities have been made part of the Turkish system.
Even after 2003, when the Green Line opened and gave Turkish Cypriots an alternative route to the world, Turkish influence remained strong. In 2018, around two-thirds of the budget is financed by Ankara. However, as with Abkhazia and Transdniestria, the relationship between small client de facto state and big patron state can be complicated. Turkish Cypriot politicians are skilled at manipulating their patron and trying to keep Ankara at arm’s length. “The politicians here just know how to stroke Turkey’s pride in order to get money,” said one interlocutor in a 2012 survey. The Justice and Development Party (AKP, from its Turkish initials) “has been in power for ten years, but our people have been in power for fifty years, and they have master’s degrees in lying to Turkey.”10
The relationship between Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots is constantly changing, however. In 2018, there are many concerns among the traditionally secular Turkish Cypriots that the AKP’s Islamist agenda is being imposed on them. A mosque-building program in the north of the island is a sign of the steadily growing influence of Turkey in the absence of other powerful countervailing actors.
Europe’s Influence and Its Limits
The northern part of Cyprus has a peculiar status with regard to the European Union. Even as it de facto comes closer to Turkey, it remains de jure part of the EU. Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty of 2003 refers to the northern part of Cyprus as “areas of the [Republic of Cyprus] in which the government . . . does not exercise effective control.” So, while it is formally part of the EU, the acquis communautaire is suspended unless and until the island is reunified.11
Turkish Cypriot institutions are not regarded as formal EU partners. However, Turkish Cypriot individuals (with the exception of settlers from the Turkish mainland) have had EU citizenship since 2004. At least 100,000 of them have taken up Republic of Cyprus passports. There is no taboo against doing so, as in Abkhazia.12 This option is not open however to post-1974 Turkish settlers or even to some who have one Turkish Cypriot parent and another from the mainland.
The EU is still an attractive model to many Turkish Cypriots, yet after the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU in 2004, effectively without the northern part of the island, the republic has vetoed many types of EU engagement with the north. This angers many Turkish Cypriots who say they voted for a European future in the 2004 referendum. At the same time, Turkey’s own aspirations to join the EU have faded, ending positive parallel trajectories by patron and client.
The northern part of Cyprus has a peculiar status with regard to the European Union. Even as it de facto comes closer to Turkey, it remains de jure part of the EU.
In 2004, the EU had greater ambitions for northern Cyprus and launched three initiatives to integrate it into Europe’s economic space: Direct Trade Regulation, Financial Aid Regulation, and Green Line Regulation. The first two were carefully launched, on April 26, 2004, two days after the referendums on the Annan Plan and five days before the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU. In its statement, the European Council declared, “The Turkish Cypriot community have expressed their clear desire for a future within the European Union. The Council is determined to put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community.”13
The Direct Trade Regulation was intended to govern direct trade between the northern part of the island and the EU. The draft proposal set out terms for a “preferential regime so Turkish Cypriots products can enter the Customs Territory of the EU.” This would happen through direct trade out of Famagusta in northern Cyprus. However, the Greek Cypriot side regarded this as recognition of the TRNC “by implication” and blocked its passage in Brussels. One Greek Cypriot expert, Philippos Savvides, said that if implemented the regulation would create a “Taiwan in the Mediterranean.”14
In 2006, the EU passed the Financial Aid Regulation, launched in concert with the Direct Trade Regulation, but only over many objections from the Republic of Cyprus. It set up an assistance program with five objectives. The largest sums were allocated to developing and restructuring infrastructure. Another program focused on social and economic development more broadly. A third concentrated on issues around the conflict, funding confidence-building measures, de-mining, and locating missing persons. A fourth funded an information campaign about the EU. Last, but not least money, was allocated to prepare Turkish Cypriots for implementation of the acquis.
The Green Line Regulation had already been prepared to manage trade across a de facto closed border within an EU territory. It aimed to revive intra-island trade, which had declined precipitously over the years and caused the north of Cyprus to trade mainly with Turkey. These latter two regulations were passed in a more limited than anticipated in 2004. The Green Line Regulation works mainly for individual shoppers who go back and forth across the line. The traffic has been mostly, but not always, from north to south, with Turkish Cypriots going south to buy consumer goods and groceries they cannot obtain in their home territory. However, larger-scale trade is not possible, as the south has banned Turkish Cypriot trucks due to an ongoing dispute about their licensing and insurance.15
One large symbolic issue has foundered due to political disputes. Cyprus’s national cheese, known as halloumi by the Greeks and hellim by Turks, has a rubbery consistency, is traditionally made from sheep’s or goat’s milk, and is often eaten grilled or fried. This cheese is one of the biggest exports from both sides of the island, and production is estimated to be worth $100 million a year in the south and $30 million a year in the north.16
In July 2014, the Republic of Cyprus unilaterally applied to the EU to secure protected designation of origin (or PDO) status for halloumi. This would give the cheese the same status as other iconic European food products such as champagne, parmesan, or Stilton cheese, which are protected by law as unique products from a certain region (to help block inauthentic competitors from elsewhere). Turkish Cypriots objected strongly to the move, saying that their hellim deserved PDO status as well. European negotiators accepted their argument. The EU attempted to turn cheese negotiations into peace negotiations by calling for a joint application from both communities.
In July 2015, after a lunch with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker declared the issue resolved. On July 28, the commission announced more details of what it called a “temporary solution pending the reunification of Cyprus,” hailing the deal as a symbol of bi-communal cooperation toward a settlement.17 An international certification body Veritas would inspect halloumi/hellim production and certify that the cheese met the appropriate sanitary standards. Brussels would provide technical assistance to producers in the north to ensure their standards met EU criteria. And there would be an amendment to the Green Line Regulation, allowing the Turkish Cypriots to export hellim via the south.
However, not long afterward, the Republic of Cyprus lodged four objections in Brussels. The Cypriot government would demand that all hellim exports come across the Green Line—currently much of the cheese is exported to Turkey and the Middle East through the northern port of Famagusta. And it objected that a separate quality inspection regime for the north would “infringe [Cyprus]’s sovereignty.”18
Despite setbacks like these, Brussels remains a powerful actor in northern Cyprus. The Financial Aid Regulation gave the EU a large budget to spend in the northern part of the island, allocating 449 million euros for the Turkish Cypriot community between 2006 and 2016. However, it also operates under political constraints, due to Greek Cypriot concerns about recognition issues.
That prevents the EU from using its preferred method of capacity building: twinning contracts, which employ partners with the appropriate expertise from EU states in the region. And the fact that the EU cannot work directly with the Turkish Cypriot de facto authorities presents an even greater challenge. Moreover, after the failure of the 2017 peace talks, the ad hoc committee that had been created to prepare northern Cyprus for the acquis was suspended. The Greek Cypriots claimed the committee’s work was directly linked to “continuing negotiations,” while the Turkish Cypriot side said the work required no such precondition.
Thus, little work has been done on capacity building to prepare northern Cyprus for the acquis, and many projects have suffered due to poor implementation. High turnover in Turkish Cypriot governments compounds the problem, with frequent elections and de facto officials vulnerable to corruption and lack of training. This leads to a vicious circle whereby existing capacity cannot be utilized properly and new capacity cannot be built—except of course from the patron state, Turkey.
A report by the European Court of Auditors in 2012 highlighted the problem:
The programme has assisted a great number of different beneficiaries across the TCc [Turkish Cypriot community] and some results have already been achieved. However, the planned construction of a seawater desalination plant, the programme’s largest project (27,5 million euro), cannot be implemented, which represents a significant setback for the programme. More generally, the sustainability of projects is often in doubt due to limited administrative and financial capacity of the [Turkish Cypriot] authorities and their delayed adoption of relevant ‘laws.’19
Pursue the Logic of EU Integration
Turkish Cyprus is caught between two incomplete integration projects. On the one side is Turkey, which funds the army, supports much of the government budget, and runs several government agencies such as the fire service. Many Turkish Cypriots oppose gradual integration into Turkey. In 2017, a de facto Turkish Cypriot official warned, “Isolation does not push you toward reconciliation, but to other forms of survival, in our case increased dependency on Turkey and integration with it. First you have economic, then cultural integration and dependency.”20
On the other side is the EU. It has a range of policy instruments, including the three regulations, whose full implementation would greatly enhance its influence. Enthusiasm for the EU has waned somewhat in northern Cyprus since the referendums of 2004. In 2017, ahead of the peace talks in Switzerland, a Turkish Cypriot official warned that the current plan would be “a more difficult sell with the Turkish Cypriot community” than fourteen years previously. Despite this, a majority of Turkish Cypriots still express pro-European sentiments. A 2015 Eurobarometer survey found that 57 percent of Turkish Cypriots held positive views of the EU, with only 8 percent expressing negative sentiments.21
Turkish Cyprus is caught between two incomplete integration projects. On the one side is Turkey, and on the other is the EU.
Turkish Cypriots’ view of the EU was thus paradoxically more positive than that held by their Greek Cypriot counterparts—or indeed EU nationals as a whole—about the organization in which they were full members.22 This demonstrates the positive pull the EU still has externally. However, Brussels should be concerned that there was a lower level of support for the EU among the younger generation, the fifteen-to-twenty-four range, compared to their older peers. For those who believe in the value of Europeanization, this is a prescription for more active EU engagement in the north. However, the Greek Cypriot side still effectively exercises a veto on greater EU engagement, even over mutually beneficial issues such as the promotion of halloumi cheese.
Amid this deadlock, some are now questioning the old paradigm of a UN-mediated bi-zonal, bi-communal federation for Cyprus. In a 2014 report, the International Crisis Group put forward a radically different proposal to break the deadlock, advocating a managed partition of the island into two independent states both within the EU.23 This is almost certainly a step too far for the international mediators who have worked for decades within one framework—let alone for the Greek Cypriots. The proposal does, however, reflect a ubiquitous frustration with the Cyprus problem.
A less controversial way to shift the paradigm and harness the EU’s power would be to begin a much more ambitious program under the Financial Aid Regulation to prepare northern Cyprus for the EU acquis now. This would be in partnership with the de facto authorities and regardless of the state of the negotiations. In other words, the EU could begin an active program of Europeanization of legislation and standards of northern Cyprus, working with the current authorities, as far as is possible, to build an EU reality in an unrecognized state. Formal adoption of the acquis would be the last brick in the wall. Before that, northern Cyprus would be a de facto state closely aligned with the EU. This approach would cross a Greek Cypriot redline about working with the de facto authorities and entail a rethink about its strategy toward the north. But it would bring real benefits to citizens in the north and surely give a positive impetus to the conflict resolution process. Facilitating de facto convergence of the two halves of the island, this process would also help forestall a much more worrying scenario for Greek Cypriots: the de facto integration of northern Cyprus into Turkey.
1 James Ker-Lindsay, The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 55.
2 “Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality,” International Crisis Group, March 14, 2014, 29, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/cyprus/divided-cyprus-coming-terms-imperfect-reality.
3 “The Situation in Cyprus,” United Nations Digital Library, April 10, 1992, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/141154/files/S_RES_750%281992%29-EN.pdf.
4 “Resolution 541 (1983),” United Nations Security Council, November 18, 1983, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/541; and James Ker-Lindsay, “Great Powers, Counter Secession, and
Non-recognition: Britain and the 1983 Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 28, no. 3 (2017): 431–53.
5 Quoted in Bryant and Hatay, De Facto Dreams.
6 Ibid. See also “Mr R.R. Denktash Addressing the UN. Security Council on Nov/1983,” YouTube video, 7:32, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Couo4LeSP88
7 Interview with author, Cyprus, June 2017.
8 This status-neutral arrangement is something the Abkhaz aspire to but have never received.
9 Jamie Dunkley, “HSBC Facing North Cyprus Legal Battle,” Telegraph, July 2012, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9418945/HSBC-facing-North-Cyprus-legal-battle.html.
10 Rebecca Bryant and Christalla Yakinthou, “Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey,” Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation, August 2012, http://tesev.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Cypriot_Perceptions_Of_Turkey_EN.pdf.
11 On Cyprus and the EU see the work of George Kyris, including The Europeanisation of Contested Statehood: The EU in Northern Cyprus (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2015).
12 If questioned about this, Turkish Cypriots say that they are taking the documents not of a Hellenic state but of the multinational state founded in 1960 that belonged to Turkish Cypriots as well.
13 “Turkish Cypriot Community,” European Commission, accessed October 31, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/cyprus/about-us/turkish-cypriots_en.
14 “Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on special conditions for trade with those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control” SEE “The European Union Dimension” in “Foreign Affairs – Second Report,” UK House of Commons, February 1, 2005, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmfaff/113/11306.htm#a21; and
Thanos Veremis and Philippos Savvides, “Cyprus After the Referenda of April 24,” Cyprus Review, February 8, 2018, http://cyprusreview.org/index.php/cr/article/view/353.
15 Mete Hatay, Julia Kalimeri, and Fiona Mullen, “Intra-island Trade in Cyprus: Obstacles, Oppositions and Psychological Barriers,” PRIO Cyprus Center, 2008, https://www.prio.org/Publications/Publication/?x=7287.
16 İpek Özerim and John Oakes, “Hellim Wars,” T-Vine, October 8, 2015, http://www.t-vine.com/hellim-wars/.
17 “Cyprus ‘Χαλλουμι’ (Halloumi)/‘Hellim’ Cheese Set to Receive Protected Designation of Origin Status,” European Commission, July 28, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5448_en.htm.
18 Özerim and Oakes, “Hellim Wars.” No progress has been made since then for either the Greek or Turkish Cypriot cheese.
19 “European Union Assistance to the Turkish Cypriot Community,” European Court of Auditors, 2012, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/turkish_cypriot_community/14650788_en.pdf.
20 Interview with author, June 2017.
21 “Eurobarometer: The Economic Situation,” European Commission, May 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_fact_cytcc_en.pdf.
22 “Eurobarometer: Life in the European Union,” European Commission.
23 “Divided Cyprus,” International Crisis Group.