The conference in London failed to suggest viable solutions to the real problems facing Afghanistan, including President Karzai’s lack of credibility, the prevalence of local corruption, and the fragmentation of power into the hands of armed local militias.
While growing Islamic extremism in Yemen is alarming, in the longer term it is the country’s domestic challenges that threaten to bring Yemen to its knees, with potentially destabilizing consequences for the region.
Russia's system of government administration is inefficient, unable to cope with both a transition of political power and the economic crisis at the same time. To ensure its own survival, the Russian regime must modernize itself.
U.S. rhetoric has become more closely aligned with European positions on the Arab-Israeli peace process and democracy and human rights promotion in the Middle East, but there has not been a significant increase in transatlantic cooperation on these issues.
At the international conference on Afghanistan in London, the international community should address the only issue that really matters for peace in Afghanistan: how to make the Taliban part of a lasting solution.
President Obama’s self-imposed deadline for closing the U.S. military detention facility in Guantanamo Bay has passed. It may take years to fully close the facility because the real problem is not only Guantanamo, but the entire U.S. detention policy.
Russian policy makers need to open space for public debate and engage in substantive discussions on critical global issues, and Western governments and institutions need to open the door to independent Russian voices.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's proposed European security treaty has its flaws, but it is a first step toward an important conversation that must take place if a viable and undivided Euro-Atlantic security space is to be created.
In response to the challenges facing the region, the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative—an international commission to build the intellectual framework for an inclusive transatlantic security system for the 21st century—has been launched.
The Obama administration announced its new Afghanistan strategy, which asks European allies to send as many as 5,000 extra combat troops in support of a war which more than two-thirds of the European public believe is already lost.
The European Union’s Afghanistan policies are the result of two different and contradictory constituencies: the transatlantic one, consisting of the United States and its European interests, and, on the other end of the spectrum, local party activists, who view Afghanistan as an unnecessary and dangerous war.
In the United States, the debate over the future of the war in Afghanistan is playing out in public, with the report by General Stanley McChrystal representing one fundamental position, and Senator John Kerry’s October 26 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations representing another.
As this year's presidential election illustrated, Afghanistan’s key problem is its lack of a credible government; while most Afghans do not want the Taliban back, they see the government of Hamid Karzai as entirely corrupt.
Offshore oil reserves are too small to significantly impact world oil prices or U.S. reliance on foreign oil. Alternatives to offshore drilling exist and could maximize long-term environmental, economic, and security gains.
USAID—the largest source of U.S. democracy assistance—requires deep-reaching reforms if the Obama administration hopes to adequately address challenges to democracy around the world.
The reality is that many Afghans see Kabul as part of the problem, and a runoff election is unlikely to change that. If the new Afghan government is to earn public support, and NATO is to find a way out of Afghanistan, a civilian surge will be vital.
When Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's secretary-general, addresses an audience at Carnegie Europe on Friday, 18th September, he will speak about the possibility of a new dialogue between two former foes – NATO and Russia. Dmitri Trenin suggests that these discussions could initially take place through the NATO-Russia Council of 2002, but in time, that they might spawn a new framework altogether.
The EU should commit itself to a ‘civilian surge', but with Afghan rather than European civilians.
Both the U.S. and French Presidents, Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy, have brought key opposition figures into their administrations. As Fabrice Pothier argues, in both cases their policy influence has been minimal.
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO's new Secretary-General, must provide transformational leadership, not just status-quo management, for the alliance to bridge the chasm between its ambitions and its capacities.