A mood of realism around the Transdniestria conflict, supported by Russia, is leading to areas of de facto integration. The Moldovan government is cautious, but this is an opportunity for more international engagement.
Europe’s commitment to the Eastern Partnership region has been cemented by Russian aggression. Yet, for internal reasons, the EU is trying to avoid the costs linked to the countries’ integration.
EU association deals with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have proven to be key drivers of reform in all three countries. The emphasis should now be on implementation, not simply legislative adoption.
Moldova, which used to be perceived as one of the most democratic post-Soviet countries, has come to be dominated by one politician.
The map of Eastern Europe contains a number of de facto separatist states created by conflict. How can the EU enhance its engagement with these territories?
The EU’s policy of non-recognition and engagement in the South Caucasus has been modestly successful and may offer useful lessons for other parts of Eastern Europe.
A recent decision by the OSCE to revive arms-control talks is unlikely to achieve much without simultaneous efforts to resolve protracted conflicts in Eastern Europe.
Despite their appealing promises, oligarchs do not offer a viable form of governance in countries such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Moldova’s election of a pro-Russian president may be symbolically important but is unlikely to assuage the conflict in the country’s breakaway region of Transdniestria.
Migration from Eastern Europe to Western EU member states is partly driven by the corruption perpetuated by political elites and local oligarchs.