In Nagorny Karabakh, the guns have fallen silent, but the aftermath of the six-week conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is still messy and unclear.
A Russian-enforced truce means an end to six weeks of bloodshed that claimed more than 5,000 lives. It promises the chance to return home for hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis displaced between 1992 and 1994, when Armenian forces captured seven Azerbaijani regions around the disputed territory of Nagorny Karabakh. However, a massive reconstruction program is needed before resettlement can begin.
It is a much-needed truce, but it is not a peace agreement. Much bitterness on the Armenian side persists. To name but one grievance, the new war displaced thousands of Armenians living within Nagorny Karabakh from their homes, and they now face an uncertain future.
Full normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan is also off the table as long as the issue of the status of Nagorny Karabakh itself, the question which triggered the conflict in 1988, remains unresolved.
In a victory speech on November 10, 2020, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev abandoned commitments he had made to grant Karabakh “the highest status in the world” and mocked his Armenian counterpart with the words, “The status went to hell. It failed; it was shattered to smithereens. It is not and will not be there. As long as I am President, there will be no status.”
Despite having suffered a crushing defeat—the worst of which he could almost certainly have prevented by negotiating more seriously—Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan also refused to concede on the status issue and again called for international recognition of “Artsakh,” as Armenians call Karabakh.
Russia, with 1,960 peacekeepers deployed on the ground, now stands squarely in the center of this process.
Russian President Vladimir Putin might see reasons to push for a full peace agreement that restores relations between two important neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Then again he might not: if the two sides are in a state of suspended hostilities, that is a good reason for the Russian peacekeepers to stay. Russia’s agenda is probably more about projecting its own power and about trade routes than about long-term peace in the South Caucasus.
One outcome of the conflict is very clear: Western countries were pushed to the margins and will need to work hard to make themselves relevant again. Attempts by France and the United States—the two other co-chairs of the OSCE’s mediating Minsk Group alongside Russia—to broker a ceasefire failed.
Following a failed meeting in Washington, DC, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo more or less advertised his own botched performance by visiting Tbilisi on November 17–18 but not traveling to Baku or Yerevan.
The fighting stopped only with Moscow’s intervention—with, according to Putin himself, intense personal telephone mediation.
Could it have been otherwise? European engagement in this conflict was quite strong in the 1990s as the OSCE was formed. The United States and France both made a concerted push to broker a negotiated settlement in the years 1999–2001.
But since about 2008, Moscow has been the main mediator. At major meetings, the French and U.S. co-chairs were excluded from the room where the main talks happened, instead waiting outside to be briefed afterward.
When fighting broke out, Washington and other European capitals were barely visible. They lost public credibility amongst Armenians and Azerbaijanis during the fighting. European statements of “concern” at the death of civilians and reports of human rights abuses were derided on social media, especially on the Armenian side.
At this crucial moment, France also turned out to be an unfortunate mediator. Given France’s large Armenian diaspora and deep antagonism with Turkey, French President Emmanuel Macron had almost no leverage with Azerbaijan.
As Russia needs some legitimacy for its peace deal, we can expect the Minsk Group co-chair format to continue. On November 19, the EU reaffirmed its support for the mechanism. But this conflict-mediation format would surely benefit from a big shake-up.
France should seriously consider renouncing its co-chair position in favor of another European country or an EU-wide position. It has held the position for twenty-three years, and a country like Germany or Sweden—having more balanced relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan—would almost certainly be able to deliver more. A new UN Security Council resolution that spells out the new realities and remaining challenge would also be very helpful.
An armed conflict between two Eastern Partnership countries has challenged the EU’s aspirations for a strategic role in the South Caucasus. The EU simply lacked the institutional tools to deal with this crisis.
Georgia, extremely wary of Russia’s new, assertive role in the South Caucasus, is drawing conclusions. Georgian opposition politicians called on Pompeo to pledge “the deployment of U.S. military infrastructure in Georgia” in response to the Russian peacekeepers in Karabakh to the south.
Having lost the war, can Europeans and Americans help shape a peace?
There is a huge amount to be done—both in Nagorny Karabakh itself and in the seven former occupied territories—that would benefit from European expertise, in partnership with UN agencies, from reconstruction and demining to facilitating resettlement.
The important and controversial issue of protecting cultural heritage and allowing access for Armenians to places of worship now under Azerbaijani control calls for international facilitation—and will be a concern that the Armenian-American community puts before the incoming U.S. administration of President-elect Joe Biden.
European NGOs also have good expertise in facilitating dialogue initiatives between fearful communities separated by war but now fated to live as neighbors once again.
This is all work that is suited to European skills. Engagement here and money spent should also provide some political leverage for both the EU and UN.
But that engagement also requires great humility. The Western powers should acknowledge that they basically allowed themselves to be bystanders to the great-power deal that halted the new war over Nagorny Karabakh.
Comments(5)
A US military "infrastructure" in Georgia could very possibly lead to WWIII. NATO is only as politically strong as US politics will allow. But most Americans no longer want to play the role of "policeman to the world". After thirty years of economic decline, populism and semi-isolationism have now taken root within the US polity. Only the elites have gained from globalization. And the elites have now become a clear target for the vast majority of Americans. At the moment, this vast majority remains separated within two political parties. But some time in this decade, US class/political division very well might change. On the other hand, a divided Europe shows very little chance of healing. The EU has absolutely zero strategic vision. Germany seems totally incapable of imagining a continent without US military leadership. I guess, Berlin feels that without NATO its role would once again be as the strongest Western power -- a nightmare scenario for German psychology as well as the historic memory of the rest of Europe! Lest we forget: the Soviet Union occupied central Europe because of Third Reich aggression; and also, the failure of the post-war settlement to demilitarize what became a new German state. But in the reality of a 21st century, German ascendency doesn't necessarily have to be so. For European strategic autonomy to exist in some form or another, a new European security architecture is required. Remember: The Biden WWII generation and the baby boomers are at the very end of their political tenure. A new generation of US leadership awaits alternative answers to ecological, economic and geopolitical challenges. The current global bi-polarity -- a US-led hegemony vs a China-Russia entente -- will not solve climate change or any other global dilemma. Meanwhile, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 remains, as fiscal and monetary profligacy reach unprecedented historical levels. To reunite Europe, including Russia within the new security architecture, is a significant element to bring about world peace. This will require a complete understanding between Moscow, Paris, Berlin and Warsaw. Europe without Russia is an historic anomaly. In fact, it is a Europe prostrate as a geopolitical actor. Russia needs to be in the tent, but the nature of the tent must change. German military power must recede, not grow stronger. So too with Russia's eastern European sphere of influence, it must also recede as Russia's forward defense moves eastward. Peace is possible!
What about protecting the Azerbaijani cultural heritage destroyed by Armenians since 90s ? What about the right to access Azerbaijani places of worship that remain under occupaion?
Who cares who brokered it. That it was agreed without having to get involved in Russia's backyard is a good thing. EUrope has too much on its plate already and that part of the world is not a priority.Ndithas ithing to do.with NATO. Please stop trying to send young men and women to.their deaths to.support a beauty comtest project.
You say that the large Armenian diaspora in France makes France useless. What about a country like Germany who has 5 million turks? Arguably worse, and pro-Turkish in every parameter
Carnegie Europe needs to undrrstand that Americans are sick and tired of endless wars. Stop trying to get Americans killed in other people's wars.
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