One of the great unsung achievements in Europe over recent years has been the remarkable rapprochement between Germany and Poland.
After decades of tense relations, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk managed to build a close alliance and even friendship between their two countries. Yet this now risks becoming undone because of fundamental differences over Russia that have emerged during the Ukraine crisis.
Previous German chancellors had tiptoed toward improving relations with their most important Eastern European neighbor. But they kept looking at Poland through the prism of Germany’s close relations with Russia.
In contrast, Merkel, chancellor since 2005, has put relations with Poland on a new footing by respecting the weight and influence the country gained by joining the EU in 2004. In reaction to Merkel’s appreciation, even long-held Polish suspicions began to dissipate. What an incredible change in perceptions after such a turbulent history of German dominance and occupation!
To cap it all, bilateral trade between Germany and Poland is higher than between Germany and Russia. In 2013, Poland was Germany’s tenth-largest trading partner with a turnover of €78.1 billion ($107.1 billion), while Russia came in eleventh with €76.5 billion ($104.9 billion).
Just as importantly, Poland and Germany together worked hard to build a special triangular relationship with Russia. That was not easy for Poland, given a history of invasion and occupation by Russia that is no lighter than what it experienced with Germany.
Tusk’s Civic Platform government, in power since 2007, has made the strategic choice of improving relations with Berlin, on the one hand, and Moscow, on the other. That strategy gave Poland more clout inside the EU because it couldn’t be seen as either anti-Russian or anti-German.
It also meant that Russia could no longer play Germany off against Poland, as it had tried to do in 2005 by imposing a ban on Polish meat exports to Russia. When Poland retaliated by saying it would veto any new EU trade partnership with Russia, Merkel took Warsaw’s side. The Russian ban was soon lifted.
That strategy paid off in other ways, too. The inhabitants of Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland, are now able to travel to Poland without a visa. That could not have happened without the Warsaw-Berlin-Moscow axis and without Warsaw and Berlin jointly lobbying the EU for a visa exemption for Russian citizens.
Now, according to Polish and German analysts, the Ukraine crisis and Germany’s policy toward Russia risk destroying this unique edifice. The reason is that the Poles suspect that Merkel, despite having been extremely critical of Putin’s policies in Ukraine, may compromise with Russia for the sake of stability.
Of course, all European governments would support efforts to restore stability in Ukraine. The specter of a return of the partisan war that was so bitterly waged during the Second World War and afterward is too awful to contemplate.
What worries Polish analysts—and some German ones—is that Germany may be tempted to make stabilization such a priority that Berlin will tacitly accept Russia’s annexation of Crimea. And they are concerned that Germany will turn a blind eye to Moscow’s continuing influence on what remains of Ukraine, including a gradual federalization of the country.
In other words, Poland fears that Germany will not make the hard decisions required to stop Russia from acting again.
One such decision, according to Warsaw, would be to have NATO troops permanently deployed in Poland and the Baltic states. Berlin opposes that on the grounds that it would provoke Russia (as if it needed any provoking).
Warsaw also has qualms about the composition of planned roundtable talks on Ukraine’s future. The chairman of the discussions, former German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger, proposed including pro-Russian militia groups in the talks. Germany is broadly in favor, but Poland fears that this could legitimate the militias’ actions. Overall, Poland sees a Germany that is unwilling to go the long haul with Russia, especially over sanctions.
If that is the case, then Germany’s role in the Ukraine crisis could weaken the EU vis-à-vis Russia, not strengthen it. This would certainly be what Russian President Vladimir Putin is hoping for, and what Poland and the Baltic states fear.
The short-term stability that Germany, other European countries, and the United States yearn for has already proven expensive. The West has tacitly accepted, but not recognized, Russia’s annexation of Crimea. It’s the same with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Russia has effectively controlled since a brief war with Georgia in 2008.
What worries the Poles is that if stability in Ukraine returns under terms suitable to the Kremlin, it may only be a matter of time before it is business as usual with Russia. That would give Russia the space to make another move.
Comments(5)
I wasn't aware that Russia had property between Poland and Lithuania. It will take years to get Crimea back_but it must be done.
Who cares for this Nulandsome German-bashing?
It is time for Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk to perform some shuttle diplomacy between London, Paris and Berlin. A very visible engagement should produce some positive results and some comfort in the investment of time well spent. To not engage London and France would be a costly mistake since they will ultimately have to become directly involved later as circumstances worsen.
The political situation in Russia today does not allow "luxury" to open new war fronts. Russia's current policy of open looks that "time goes by step". Wanting to appear "transparent and pacifism", the new policy of Russia is under the old Roman word "divide and conquer". Poland has had to eternally situated in front of Russia's intentions to include it as "first-line area in front of the West". Being NATO members Poland can be felt safe, despite political What follows Germany in its entirety actions. Ultimately, in the framework of NATO defense strategy, Germany would respond in the group is required to be expansionist Russia.
There is an ever-present danger that we begin to hear our own echo, when discussing geopolitics, and believe it to another voice agreeing with us. For example, the idea of stationing NATO troops as some kind of barrier to battalions of Russian tanks storming through Poland is very far fetched, and owes much to the unconscious projection of our own nostalgic imagery. That is the war the boys with their toys in NATO want, because such a clean war, where everyone wears uniforms, and where NATO hardware can demonstrate its strengths, would make them heroes. They would save the world, and get to blow stuff up at the same time. It isn't like that now, and it isn't going to be like that for many years hence. Put it from your mind. If and when Russia starts appealing to the slavic people as a people, Europe is going to face an serious set of security issues. Look carefully at the polish eurovision entry. Very conservative, very slavic, very feminine, and very anti feminist clothing from all those young ladies. We talk about Tusk. Right, so who did he sack from his cabinet for having conservative views on sexuality and culture? Jaraslow Gowin. And who is his best friend and business partner? Porto Poroschenko. Our guy, right? Maybe. Putin is getting a lot of votes by preaching a conservative slavic cultural revival, and he is not alone or isolated. Europe will burn like a torch if the policy wonks get this wrong, and boy, are they getting it wrong.
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