Unconvinced by the EU’s stance toward an increasingly assertive China, Australia has sidelined Europe in its approach to the Indo-Pacific. This places Canberra’s trade and diplomatic relations with Europe at risk.
Blaming NATO and the United States for the West’s failure in Afghanistan won’t help Europe establish a credible security and defense policy. Its continued absence leaves the EU’s citizens and neighborhoods vulnerable.
Western governments must be clear that any eventual engagement with the Taliban will have strict conditions, including respect for women’s rights. Speaking to the Taliban leadership should not be equated with legitimizing the new regime.
The fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban lays bare Europe’s lack of strategic foresight and dangerous dependence on the United States. The EU must address its shortcomings or risk losing the ability to defend its values and interests.
At the latest NATO summit, allies jointly identified China as a systemic challenge to alliance security. But diverging views on China’s challenge among the partners hinder a consensus on NATO action.
Globally, EU assistance has been slow to materialize. Supporting countries in dire need of coronavirus vaccines—through both the provision of vaccines and the sharing of patents—would project the union's soft power capacity.
The EU should back a coordinated global industrial strategy, including vaccine production facilities across the world, otherwise China will plug the gap. That means challenging private-sector patent monopolies.
The Biden administration is making the defense of human rights one of its foreign policy priorities. Other democracies, particularly in Europe, should actively support this shift.
It should, but it won’t. The EU’s post-pandemic recovery fund will help the union’s economies get off the ground. But as for integrating Europe’s foreign, security, and digitization policies, the political will and strategic ambition are absent.
Europe will have to juggle environmental concerns, access to resources, and the Arctic’s growing geostrategic role. This will require cooperation with all the major players, including China, if the region is to remain stable and peaceful.
The EU’s new investment deal with China robs the bloc of leverage, contradicts its policy of working closely with the United States on Beijing, and makes a mockery of Europe’s commitment to values.
International politics saw a surge in new words and a return of old expressions. Going through some of them gives us a flavor of the year of 2020, which few of us will look back to with nostalgia.*
Incoming U.S. president Joe Biden offers a chance to renew transatlantic ties and forge a common EU-U.S. policy toward China. But for that to happen, the Europeans must agree on how to deal with Beijing.
Come January 2021, the United States and Germany will have to move quickly to resolve big differences, notably over China and Russia. At stake is the strength of transatlantic ties between America and Europe.
The rivalry between China and the United States over climate change gives the EU a unique opportunity to become a strategic, global player on this issue.
The world is in desperate need of American leadership. But what should America’s allies and competitors expect from the next U.S. president? Here are Carnegie’s views from China, Europe, India, Lebanon, Russia, and the United States.
The rapidly eroding trust between the UK and the EU casts a dark shadow over the future of European foreign policy cooperation. But as the eventful summer of 2020 has shown, that cooperation is much needed.
While Australia wants Europe to take a tougher line on China, joining a liberal-democratic front to counter Beijing’s increasing assertiveness and bullying comes with great risks.
As European countries emerge from lockdown, Europe needs to prepare for the geostrategic shifts that will take place in the post-coronavirus world.
What happens in Hong Kong with China’s new national security legislation will seriously test Europe’s commitment to democracy, international law, and human rights.