In the wake of the failed putsch in Turkey on July 15 and the ensuing perplexities in Western military circles, questions have been asked about Ankara’s reliability in NATO and in the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. My question today is different: Will Russia’s long game of undermining the EU’s cohesion, the U.S. status as the major superpower, or the role of NATO find fertile ground in post-coup Turkey? One hypothesis is that Russia may go for a long-term game-changing move and lure Turkey away from the West as part of a broader geopolitical reconfiguration.
In Turkey, the state and the people are in shock, the army is being reorganized, and a wide-ranging purge is ongoing. Anti-Western sentiments are on the rise among a number of politicians and a large segment of the population. There is unease at the thought that Western powers are evaluating the coup’s potential damage to NATO’s second-largest conventional army, the possible consequences for the defense of Europe, and the implications for operations of the anti–Islamic State coalition.
Russia, for its part, has a long-standing policy of challenging NATO, the United States, and the EU, for example through the harassment of NATO’s defenses around Europe or through its good relations with the most vocal anti-EU forces on European soil in, say, France, Hungary, or the UK. Similarly, the Russian military intervention in Syria that began in September 2015 illustrated a willingness to counter Western influence in the Middle East in addition to rescuing the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
Against this complex background, the presidents of Russia and Turkey will meet in Saint Petersburg on August 9.
Their first objective will be to close the dispute triggered by the downing of a Russian aircraft over Turkish territory in November 2015. Exports, construction contracts, and tourism have been badly affected by the resulting Russian sanctions, so reconciliation will bring welcome economic benefits to Turkey. Also, Russia—already a major partner of Turkey in the energy sector, providing 58 percent of Turkey’s gas consumption and building a nuclear power plant—could resume work on the suspended Turkish Stream pipeline across the Black Sea, which would boost Turkey’s hub as a gas supplier to Europe.
The two leaders will discuss another set of issues: counterterrorism cooperation, fighting the Islamic State, and the future political settlement in Syria. Moscow’s demands that Ankara seal the border between Turkey and Islamic State–controlled territory in Syria do not differ much from similar Western requests; but discussions about the future of the Assad regime and the role of Syrian Kurds will be more delicate.
Given Russia’s predominant role in rescuing the regime in Damascus and shaping the military and diplomatic landscape in Syria since September 2015, there is very little chance that Ankara can alter Moscow’s view on a political transition in Syria. The price for a real Russian-Turkish reconciliation might well be an admission by Ankara that the best formula for ending the Syrian civil war and containing the Islamic State is to maintain the regime in place, including Assad, whose fate will be ultimately determined by Russian-style free elections.
Incidentally, an evolution of Ankara’s policy toward overt acceptance of the Assad regime might usefully ease up some tensions at home, as Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has long viewed the Assad regime as a guarantor of Turkey’s security.
Concerning the Syrian Kurds, who are currently the best partners of Russia and the United States in fighting the Islamic State, Ankara will probably want to obtain firm guarantees that the combat role of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the armed wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), does not connect with the activities of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. If such guarantees are not possible, Moscow and Ankara will have to agree to disagree.
Either way, the outcome of the Saint Petersburg talks will be a major occasion to check where Turkey stands on the future of Syria and the fight against the Islamic State.
But there might be an even bigger game in town. Like Berlin, Brussels, Paris, and Washington, Moscow immediately supported the legitimacy of elected institutions in Turkey in the wake of the failed coup attempt. But unlike Western capitals, Moscow has not bothered much with rule-of-law considerations. A trend toward a more authoritarian leadership in Turkey, one with fewer checks and balances than in any Western democracy, is not something to worry Russian President Vladimir Putin much. On the contrary, it helps him demonstrate that the Russian style of muscular governance is useful to Turkey, at a time when the EU and the United States keep reminding Ankara of their own brand of liberal democracy.
At the same time, the Turkish leadership is forging ahead with the reformation of the armed forces, the elimination of conspiratorial forces within the state and the society, and the organization of an executive presidential system, closer in nature to the Kremlin’s political architecture than that of France or the United States. While doing all this, Ankara also needs demonstrations of untainted support from third countries.
In Saint Petersburg, an opportunistic convergence of minds might therefore emerge between the two leaders, with each having his own reasons. Although the Turkish foreign minister was prompt on July 30 to state that relations with Russia and with the West were not alternatives, the temptation for Moscow could be to use its reconciliation with Ankara to shame the Western response to Turkey’s attempted putsch, or as an opportunity to promote Russia’s Eurasian policy framework.
The fact remains that Turkey operates within two fundamentals: its biggest economic anchor by far is the EU, with few viable alternatives; and its proven security anchor is the United States and NATO. Save in the energy sector, today there is little in Russia’s economic or military attractiveness that can compete with these realities, other than a purely political narrative.
In the short term, an easy diplomatic move for Russia could consist of a rapprochement between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Turkey—that is, beyond the “dialogue partner” status that Turkey currently enjoys. This would satisfy pride on both sides without costing much. In the longer term, if Russia decided to discuss with Turkey a partnership on political and defense matters, it would be part of a much broader game across the European continent.
Comments(9)
The witch hunt that Erdogan is organizing will probably not only cripple the army but also the business community. Gulen's sympathizers have been the motor of Turkey' social and economical development in the last 10-15 years. By eliminating these highly educated figures and replacing them by pious and docile Erdogan's sympathizers, it is inevitable that the country growth will stop and probably reverse. Any sign of an economical slowdown may snowball. Turkey has lost the Arab market. It was about to loose the Russian market and the EU will stay in recession fore a while, especially after Brexit. Erdogan has a serious dilemma. Economically he needs Russia but he also needs to recover the markets for the Turkish goods that has been shrinking since Turkey took the naive position of believing Syria was weak and would bow to Erdogan's Sunni Islamist demands. Because of his lack of education, Erdogan is obsessed by Islam as a way to rule the country. It is having a destructive effect on the country and the region. The sooner he leaves his position, the best it would be. For the security and prosperity of the region maybe it is Erdogan who should be toppled, not Bashar al Assad.
I just stopped reading this comment at "...By eliminating these highly educated figures and replacing them by ..." Because just like myself there are hundreds of thousands of people who know as a fact that Feto himself, and many people around him -specially the ones claim they are the admirers of his political and religious views- have nothing more than few high school degrees that were "bought" via some "influential" people close to Turkish government. Google is your friend. But what's worse than a "lost credibility" is the effort of justifying that with lies...! Like Trump would say: "So sad..."
Because history has become a source of knowledge, and a witness of the right and a witness to falsehood, and noting majority of canceled, and the result of it to perish from perishing for him and life say about evidence, and, as in the Book of Genesis, is a man became a distinctive goodness of evil, and what the quran adopted events history reference and witness Anne of history that evolution is amazing, and difference between past history and happens where his future, not and is the Quran Announcement seal prophecies, closing this door, which was open before, entered the human epoch, Hobo era verses and selves that will see the sincerity of the principles of all the prophecies.
If we are right, as we see in history a picture of creativity creator in his perpetual, I do not admire, but if we find that the actual strength of the impact of history in human minds that are similar, degree internal vulnerability to the impact of history, according to historical circumstances of those who received, as inevitable that the tendency curiosity to strengthen the ability to absorb the history, but curiosity will not arise unless seemed visible process of social change is a clear and obvious shining strong, because without this exciting creative aspiration remains the greatest thing we know from history structures influence on the self-mute, does not make a difference because eyes that look at it do not see where something.
Those who do not take lessons from history will themselves become lessons for others.
please also consider the fact that erdogan and west was best friends few years ago. once mutual interests falled apart west depicted a saddam portray from Erdo?an. There is also one more fact to take into account that Turkey recovered its own democracy by the prevention of the coupe attempt. You'll see how it will reconciliate Turkey's interior political conflicts. Because opposition and government party came together after the attack on the parliement. As come to the "western side of democracy", the biggest mistake is the west is doing to intervene third countries internal matters by "brining democracy" cliche. West does it sometimes with hard power such as in Iraq and sometimes with softpower as happened in Turkey by EU enlargement process. Erdogan is creation of the EU during "Turkey's EU enlargement process for more enhanced democracy" Therefore, Authorism of Erdogan story in Turkey does not make sense any more after the western supported coup happened. What west disregarded that the people of Turkey would like to have Millitary Coupe rather than Erdogan's style of governance. This is well know fact that, EU process is used against Turkey to supress Kemalist sentiments in Turkey by prisoning Kemalist writers, journalists, army members and etc in order to reach Western benefits by dealing with Erdogan ( who was afraid from the Kemalist opposition so much at time.) These things were happening on the name of enriching democracy under EU membership process. So the all national instruments of Turkey is sent to the jail during EU membership process and to place CIA based Gulen Movement's extansion.
You hit the nail on the head. Putin being pragmatic as usual. When was the last time the USA acted in a realistic pragmatic way?
Seems like a fair analysis. Erdogan has to be careful in making an abrupt change in relations with either the EU or the USA. Both are very important for Turkey despite the fact that Turkey could not be integrated into EU, for it being a Muslim State. Given the current situation of the Muslim, countries, in general, EU can not be slapped with entire blame. Erdogan has to be more open and a tolerant instead of amassing maximum powers. Erdogan, Instead of letting Vladimir Putin play Turkey against the West, could be in a much better position to play Russia against the West and extract the most from both sides. Erdogan also has to get his 3 sons out of politics, who are enjoying privileged positions, which is clearly a conflict of interests. He should present himself for accountability as there have been some valid accusations of corruption against him. He should disassociate himself and his family from Pakistani, world fame plunderer, Nawaz Shariff, and his family. Turkey needs to disengage itself from the Syrian conflict and start negotiations with Kurds to pacify them politically. IS should be ignored altogether as it is not in a position to engage Turkey once left alone. All avenues should be explored to build the economy. Thanks.
Much of the predictions made on 3 Aug were exercised by both parties' contributions in St. Petersburg meeting on 9 Aug. However those predictions were not too far from what we were shown largely by the MSM from the beginning of August. The game you emphasize I think is a lot deeper than few simple predictive topics, especially when it is considered there are other "seemingly" inactive but actually very "directly" effective cast members' roles, such as Iran and Azerbaijan, that were in the past few years, are right now, and well will be in the future, ready for helping to shape Turkey's political decisions. I may be wrong as well but I happened to sense a little underestimation when it comes to Turkey's view on "Eurasia" in your article. Current political climate in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt has already managed to put a huge question mark on the minds of millions of citizens about whether or not NATO should still remain as a path to be walked on. There is no doubt for those tens of millions that a possibility of accomplishment of establishing a Kurdish/Western corridor in northern Syria along Turkish border -let alone the odds of how future Western support to the biggest threat at home, PKK would be like- is more than enough for the whole country to stay alert against a danger in the horizon that has been directly threatening Turkey's unitary structure since 2011. So I think Turkey's relations with Russia, after July 15, is bounded to find a mutual solution that satisfies both sides in the name of protecting sovereign and "unitary" rights. That's the expectation of millions of Turkish citizens do have and that expectation can no longer be ignored by no players after July 15.
Comment Policy
Comments that include profanity, personal attacks, or other inappropriate material will be removed. Additionally, entries that are unsigned or contain "signatures" by someone other than the actual author will be removed. Finally, steps will be taken to block users who violate any of the posting standards, terms of use, privacy policies, or any other policies governing this site. You are fully responsible for the content that you post.